The State of Utah v. David R. Warden : Brief of Appellee by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1990
The State of Utah v. David R. Warden : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Darwin C. Hansen; Morgan and Hansen; Attorney for Appellee.
Melvin C. Wilson; Davis County Attorny; Brian J. Namba; Deputy Davis County Attorney; Attorney
for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation







\j i r\i i v^wi I X U I V I L . w u u r \ | 
BRIEF. 
9ooo*7 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
DAVID R. WARDEN, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
Case No. 900087 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
Appeal from the Judgment of the 
Second Circuit Court, Layton Department 
Hon. K. Roger Bean, Judge 
MELVIN C. WILSON 
Davis County Attorney 
BRIAN J. NAMBA 
Deputy Davis County Attorney 
P.O. Box 618 
Farmington, Utah 84025 
Attorney or Appellant 
DARWIN C. HANSEN 
Attorney at Law 
Morgan & Hansen 
8th Floor, Kearns Building 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorney for Appellee 
FILED 
stF \ y \m 
Clerk, Supreme Court, Utah 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
DAVID R. WARDEN, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
Case No. 900087 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
Appeal from the Judgment of the 
Second Circuit Court, Layton Department 
Hon. K. Roger Bean, Judge 
MELVIN C. WILSON 
Davis County Attorney 
BRIAN J. NAMBA 
Deputy Davis County Attorney 
P.O. Box 618 
Farmington, Utah 84025 
DARWIN C. HANSEN 
Attorney at Law 
Morgan & Hansen 
8th Floor, Kearns Building 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorney for Appellee 
Attorney or Appellant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW . . . 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 1 
OPINION BELOW 2 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 4 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 11 
ARGUMENT 12 
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS APPLIED THE PROPER 
STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR EXAMINING THE 
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT 
TRIAL 12 
A. The Court of Appeals applied the 
proper standard for a Defendant's 
challenge of his conviction based 
on insufficiency of evidence 14 
B. Appellant confuses the standard for 
"conflicting evidence" with the 
standard for "insufficiency of 
evidence." 16 
II. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL FAILED 
TO SHOW THAT DEFENDANT'S CONDUCT 
CONSTITUTED A "SUBSTANTIAL AND 
UNJUSTIFIABLE RISK" WHICH WAS A "GROSS 
DEVIATION" FROM THE STANDARD OF CARE 
THUS CAUSING THE DEATH OF THE CHILD 18 
A. The evidence presented at 
trial was insufficient to 
i 
e s t a b l i s h t h a t D e f e n d a n t ' s 
c o n d u c t c o n s t i t u t e d a 
s u b s t a n t i a l and u n j u s t i f i a b l e 
r i s k 18 
B. T h e e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d b y 
Defendan t demons t ra ted t h a t h i s 
conduct was w i t h i n t h e s t a n d a r d of 
c a r e . . 23 
CONCLUSION 25 
i i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Neitzel v. State. 655 P.2d 325 (Alaska App. 1982) 14 
Scharf v. BMG Corp. . 700 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985) 15 
State v. Anderton. 668 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1983) 16 
State v. Bolsinaer. 699 P.2d 1214 (Utah 1985) . . . . 13, 14, 16 
State v. Booker. 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985) 13 
State v. Dver. 671 P.2d 142 (Utah 1983) 14 
State v. Gabaldon. 735 P.2d 410 (Utah App. 1987) 13 
State v. Hopkins. 782 P.2d 475, 477 (Utah 1989) 13 
State v. Johnson. 663 P.2d 48, 49-50 (Utah 1983) . . . . 12, 16 
State v. Mills. 530 P.2d 1272 (Utah 1975) 15 
State v. Petree. 659 P.2d 443 (Utah 1983) •. . .« 16 
State v. Stewart. 729 P.2d 610 (Utah 1986) 17 
State v. Tolman. 775 P.2d 422 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) . . 1, 12, 17 
State v. Warden. 784 P.2d 1204 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) . 2, 12, 13, 
16-19, 23 
State v. Watson. 684 P.2d 39, 41 (Utah 1984) 17 
STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. §76-2-103(4) (1990) 2, 18, 20 
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-206 (1990) 3, 18 
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-206(1) (1988) . . 20 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(a)(Supp. 1990) 1 
iii 
Utah Code Ann. §76-2-103(4) (1990) 2, 15 
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-206 (1990) 2, 3, 15 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(A)(Supp. 1990) 1 
iv 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellant, : BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
vs. : Case No. 900087 
DAVID R. WARDEN, : 
Defendant/Appellee. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
1. Jurisdiction is conferred upon the Utah Supreme 
Court to hear this appeal by Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2 (3) (a) (Supp. 
1990). 
2. This appeal is from a decision of the Utah Court 
of Appeals, reversing the jury verdict of the Second Circuit 
Court of Davis County, Layton Department, convicting Defendant of 
negligent homicide, a Class A Misdemeanor. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the Utah Court of Appeals apply the proper 
standard of review for examining the sufficiency of the evidence 
presented at trial? See State v. Tolman. 775 P.2d 422 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989). 
2. Did the Utah Court of Appeals properly conclude 
that the evidence presented at trial failed to show that 
Defendant's conduct constituted a "substantial and unjustifiable 
risk" which was a "gross deviation" from the standard of care? 
See Utah Code Ann. §76-2-103(4) (1990). 
3. Should the Utah Court of Appeals have applied the 
standard for "contradictory and conflicting evidence" as opposed 
to the standard for "insufficiency of evidence?" 
OPINION BELOW 
The opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals in State v. 
Warden, 784 P.2d 1204 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), appears as Appendix A 
to this brief. 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
1. Utah Code Ann. §76-2-103(4) (1990) 
Definition of criminal negligence or 
criminally negligent. 
* * * 
A person engages in conduct 
(4) With criminal negligence or is 
criminally negligent with respect to the 
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the 
result of his conduct when he ought to be 
aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk 
that the circumstances exist or the result 
will occur. The risk must be of such a 
nature and degree that the failure to 
perceive it constitutes a gross deviation 
from the standard of care that an ordinary 
person would exercise in all the 
2 
circumstances as viewed from the actor's 
standpoint• 
2. Utah Code Ann. §76-5-206 (1990) 
Negligent homicide. 
* * * 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes 
negligent homicide if the actor, acting with 
criminal negligence, causes the death of 
another. 
(2) Negligent homicide is a Class A 
misdemeanor. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, David R. Warden, was charged with Negligent 
Homicide, a Class A Misdemeanor, under Utah Code Ann. §76-5-206 
(1990). The defendant was initially tried by jury in the Second 
Circuit Court, Layton Department, beginning November 16, 1987; 
however, the Court declared a mistrial November 18, 1987 due to 
improper testimony given by one of the Statefs witnesses. A 
second jury trial began February 22, 1988, and continued through 
February 26, 1988. Defendant was convicted as charged. 
The conviction was reversed by the Utah Court of 
Appeals on November 22, 1989. The Court reversed the conviction 
because of insufficiency of the evidence, based upon the State's 
failure to establish a "substantial and unjustifiable risk of 
death." 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant is a physician having graduated from the 
University of Pennsylvania Medical School in 1964. His 
internship was at Madigan General Hospital, Fort Lewis, 
Washington (T. Vol. IVf page 40, lines 8 - 20). After four years 
in the military service, he settled in Kaysville, Davis County, 
Utah, to practice family medicine where he has been ever since 
(Id. at page 43, lines 12 - 20). He was Board certified in 
family medicine in 1970 and has been so certified until the 
present time (Id. at page 43, lines 22 - 25 and page 44, lines 1 
- 13) . 
During his practice, Defendant attended approximately 
2500 deliveries, 300 of which were home deliveries (Id. at page 
45, lines 9 - 25) . A home delivery patient must be low risk, 
hospital facilities should be near in case of emergency and 
there must be family support for the mother and child following 
delivery fid, at page 48, lines 1 - 25; page 49, lines 1 - 23; 
page 240, line 6; page 242, line 11). 
The mother of the deceased child is Joanne Young. She 
lived in Kaysville, Utah, with her parents, Maurice and Ivy 
Young, who are from England having arrived in the United States 
in 1985 (T. Vol. I at page 42, line 19 - page 44, line 7). 
Maurice and Ivy are the parents of seven children (Joanne being 
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number 5) all of whom were born in England. Four were home 
deliveries (Id. at page 44, line 24 - page 45, line 3). 
Joanne became pregnant out-of-wedlock in early 1986. 
She thought conception had occurred in March (T. Vol. Ill, page 
40. lines 10 - 15). She told her parents in early summer. 
Thereafter, Joanne and Ivy went to see Dr. Mark Bitner who 
specializes in obstetrics and was officed at the Tanner Clinic in 
Layton, Utah (Id. at page 40, line 10 - page 42, line 18). 
They visited Dr. Bitner twice - once on June 27 and 
again August 8, 1986 (T. Vol. II, page 173, line 24 - page 174, 
line 4 and page 176, lines 15 - 18). A complete OB exam was not 
performed on the first visit because there was a question about 
payment fid, at page 174, lines 23 - 25 and page 218, lines 19-
22) because Maurice did not have medical insurance coverage for 
his daughter fid, at page 148, line 14 - page 150, line 8). 
Nevertheless, Joanne and Ivy returned for the second visit at 
which time a complete OB exam was done. Her pregnancy was 
determined to be normal (low risk) fid, at page 226, lines 16-
page 228, line 16; T. Vol. Ill, page 202, lines 2 - 4 and T. Vol. 
IV, page 243, line 13 - page 246, line 2) and the date of 
delivery determined to be in early December, 1986. However, Dr. 
Bitner recommended an ultrasound to confirm that finding because 
he was uncertain (T. Vol II at page 219, line 12 - page 220, line 
5 
12) . Joanne never returned for the test. She and her family 
were concerned about the cost of a hospital delivery (T. Vol III, 
page 101, line 1 - page 104, line 3; T. Vol. II, page 149, line 
21 - page 150, line 8 and Id. at page 341, line 7 - page 342, 
line 5). 
Joanne and Ivy decided on a home delivery and asked 
Defendant to attend (T. Vol III, page 49, lines 4 - 15). They 
visited him September 8, 1986 (Id. at page 50, lines 15 - 20). 
Defendant examined Joanne and assessed her for home delivery. He 
found her to be a suitable candidate and agreed to attend the 
birth of the child (T. Vol. IV, page 51, line 21 - page 59, line 
19) . Defendant confirmed the date of delivery to be early 
December, 1986 fid, at page 57, line 3 - page 58, line 9). He 
saw her again October 6, 1986. The exam did not change his prior 
assessment (Id. at page 60, line 9 - page 63, line 12). 
On the morning of November 7, 1986, Defendant was at 
the University of Utah Football Stadium with the Davis High 
School Football Team as its team physician where they were 
participating in the State Tournament. He was contacted by Ivy 
through his remote telephone and advised that Joanne had awakened 
with some vaginal bleeding evidenced by spotting (T. Vol. IV, 
page 67, line 7 - page 69, line 22; T. Vol. Ill, page 107, line 4 
- page 106, line 18). Both Ivy and Defendant were concerned that 
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labor was beginning early. Defendant advised Ivy to keep Joanne 
down and call him about 1:00 p.m. or sooner if the situation 
worsened (T. Vol. II, page 20, line 7 - 2 3 ; Vol. IV, page 69, 
line 7 0 page 71, line 5) . 
Ivy called again about mid-day and advised Defendant 
that the bleeding had stopped and that John Shaw, the father of 
the child, had said conception may have occurred a month earlier 
which would have made Joanne full term (T. Vol. IV, page 71, line 
7 - page 73, line 19; Vol. Ill at page 108, line 19 - page 110, 
line 20; Vol. II, at page 20, line 20 - page 22, line 21 and Id. 
at page 339, line 4 - page 340, line 3). Defendant advised Ivy 
to call again around 5:00 p.m. if Joanne appeared to be 
continuing with labor (T. Vol. IV, page 73, lines 3 - 19). 
Ivy called late afternoon and advised Defendant that 
Joanne was having occasional contractions. He instructed her to 
call when the contractions were three to five minutes apart (T. 
Vol. IV, at page 74, line 24 - page 75, line 25; T. Vol. I, at 
page 65, line 17 - page 66, line 23 and Vol II, page 25, line 7-
line 23). 
Ivy called Defendant at home about 10:15 p.m. and 
advised that Joanne was in the last stages of labor. Defendant 
arrived at the Young residence at 10:30 p.nu (T. Vol. I, page 67, 
line 2 - page 68, line 18). 
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Upon arrival, he met Maurice at the door, went into the 
bedroom, examined Joanne, found that delivery was imminent and 
delivered a male infant at 10:40 p.m. The child presented in a 
breach position and was delivered within one minute without 
difficulty. There was no evidence of untoward bleeding nor was 
the amniotic fluid tinged with blood. The child breathed 
spontaneously without stimulation, had a normal heart rate and 
Defendant assessed the infant as having a one minute and five 
minute APGAR score of 8 indicating that the child had good 
potential for sustaining life (T. Vol. IV, page 77, line 17-
page 86, line 5) . 
The child was small. Defendant estimated his weight as 
being between 4 - 5 pounds. Defendant thought it was premature 
(T. Vol. IV, page 86, lines 8 - 18). 
Following birth, the child exhibited symptoms of 
grunting respirations which could be controlled by positioning 
the child. Defendant advised Ivy that perhaps hospitalization 
was indicated. She expressed concern about the expense. 
Defendant showed Joanne how to nurse the child, instructed her 
how to keep the child warm and told Ivy that she must watch the 
child during the night concerning his temperature, color and 
respiration and if they worsened to call him. Ivy acknowledged 
the instructions and Defendant left the home at about 11:30 p.m. 
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(Id, at page 96, line 13, through page 105, line 4; Vol, 1, page 
85, lines 15 - 18; Vol. Ill, page 122, line 12 - page 130, line 
11). 
Defendant did not hear from the family until the next 
day about noon when he called the home and was advised the child 
had died, (Id. at page III, line 7 - page 113, line 5). 
During the night, Ivy moved Joanne and the child into 
another bedroom where it was warmer. On two occasions, she 
observed that the child's hands and feet were "very blue" which 
concerned her. About 5:00 a.m. they got the child up and Joanne 
held him. He still appeared blue. They wrapped him in a quilt. 
At 8:00 a.m., the child appeared to have stopped breathing. Ivy 
observed the condition and resuscitated him. She did not want 
Joanne to be aware of the situation. Ivy worked with the child 
for approximately 20 minutes (T. Vol. I, page 86, line 17 - page 
97, line 24; Vol. II, page 44, line 14 - page 68, line 11; Vol. 
Ill, page 136, line 7 - 12). 
Ivy called Iris Auger, a friend and neighbor, at about 
8:30 a.m. and told her of the birth and that the child was small. 
Iris recommended that the child be hospitalized. Ivy said they 
were trying to get the doctor. Ivy did not disclose to Iris that 
the child had appeared to have stopped breathing minutes earlier 
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nor that there was an emergency (T. Vol. V, page 75, line 15-
page 83, line 3; Vol. V, page 87, line 19 - page 88, line 2). 
Ivy called Defendant's office between 8:30 and 9:00 
a.m. but he was not in. She did not identify herself or report 
any emergency concerning the child. She also called Defendant's 
home but he was not there. Again, she did not identify herself 
or report an emergency. (T. Vol. I, page 95, line 20 - page 97, 
line 23; Vol. II, page 69, line 6 - page 72, line 5; Vol. V, page 
23, line 6 - page 26, line 11). 
During the night and morning hours Ivy did not contact 
Defendant, did not call the paramedics nor did she take the child 
to the hospital notwithstanding the child's deteriorating 
condition (T. Vol. II, page 75, line 14 - page 77, line 11). 
She called her Bishop in the LDS Church but did not advise him of 
the emergency. The Bishop contacted Frank Kramer, M.D., a 
pediatrician who went to the Young home (T. Vol. V, page 38, line 
2 - page 45, line 3; Vol. II, page 260, line 21 - page 261, line 
25) . 
The Bishop and Dr. Kramer arrived about 10:30 a.m. The 
child appeared lifeless. He was rushed to Humana North Davis 
Hospital where he was pronounced dead at approximately 11:15 a.m. 
(T. Vol. II, page 283, lines 20 - 23; Id. at page 262, line 1-
page 268, line 9). 
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A post-mortem examination indicated the child died of 
respiratory-distress syndrome (R. at page 69 - 71). 
Defendant was available by telephone during the night 
of November 7th and the morning hours of November 8th• 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The decision of the Utah Court of Appeals correctly 
reversed the conviction of Dr. Warden which should be affirmed 
for the following reasons: 
First, the Court of Appeals correctly applied the 
standard of review concerning the sufficiency of evidence 
presented at trial. 
Second, the appellant failed to present sufficient 
evidence at trial to show that his conduct constituted a 
"substantial and unjustifiable risk" of death to the child such 
that he should have been aware of it; and, failed to establish 
that his conduct constituted a "gross deviation from the standard 
of care." 
Third, the defense's testimony established that 
defendant's conduct was within the standard of care for home 
deliveries. 
Fourth, appellant's contention that the Court of 
Appeals should have applied the standard for "conflicting and 
contradictory evidence" is misplaced. The Court did not reverse 
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defendant's conviction on the grounds that defendant presented 
contradictory evidence, but rather on grounds that the 
prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence establishing 
Defendant's criminal negligence beyond a reasonable doubt. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS APPLIED THE PROPER 
STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR EXAMINING THE 
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT 
TRIAL. 
The Court of Appeals correctly applied Utah law in 
reviewing the evidence presented at Defendant's trial. It is 
well-settled that an appellate court has the power to review a 
case concerning "sufficiency of evidence." State v. Johnson, 663 
P.2d 48, 49-50 (Utah 1983). The Court of Appeals stated that 
"[w]e review defendant's claim under a standard that does not 
permit us to substitute our judgment for that of the jury in a 
criminal trial." See State v. Warden, 784 P. 2d 1204, 1208 
(citing State v. Tolman, 775 P.2d 422, 424 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Quoting Tolman, the court stated: 
[w]e review the evidence and all 
interferences which may reasonably be drawn 
from it in a light most favorable to the 
verdict of the jury. We reverse a jury 
conviction for insufficient evidence only 
when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
a crime of which he was convicted. 
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Warden, 784 P.2d 1204, 1208 (emphasis added); State v. Booker, 
709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985); State v, Hopkins. 782 P.2d 475, 
477 (Utah 1989). The standard of review applied by the Court of 
Appeals clearly follows Utah precedent. See State v. Gabaldon, 
735 P.2d 410 (Utah App. 1987) (court will review evidence and all 
inferences in a light most favorable to the jury verdict.) 
On appeal, appellant argues that the changes in the 
Court of Appealfs unpublished opinions indicate that the court's 
rationale for its conclusion did not follow Utah law 
(Appellant's brief pages 17-19). Appellant's assertions are 
unfounded. First, it is inappropriate to challenge an official 
opinion with language which has been removed from prior drafts. 
Second, by comparing the earlier and subsequent versions of the 
Court of Appeals opinion, it is clear from the revision that the 
court understood the law which it applied. The court properly 
stated the standard of review and weighed the testimony of the 
state's medical expert witnesses in a light most favorable to the 
jury's verdict. 
Additionally, appellant cites State v. Bolsinger, 699 
P.2d 1214 (Utah 1985), as precedent for four factors that the 
jury was entitled to assess in relation to Defendant's conduct 
during decedent's birth (Appellant's brief, pages 19-22). 
Appellant's reliance on Bolsinaer is misplaced. In Bolsinger, 
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the defendant was charged with second-degree murder under a 
theory of "depraved indifference." The Utah Supreme Court, 
relying on Neitzel v. State. 655 P.2d 325 (Alaska App. 1982), 
enumerated "four factors a jury should be asked when it evaluates 
conduct resulting in death and alleged to be depraved 
indifference." Id. at 1220 (emphasis added). 
Both Bolsinqer and Neitzel addressed the factors the 
jury should examine when assessing the evidence presented in a 
second-degree murder prosecution. Appellant asserts that lf[t]he 
jury was entitled to assess each of the . . . factors in relation 
to this case to determine whether the defendant was criminally 
negligent" (Appellant's Brief, page 19). However, the mens rea 
standard for depraved indifference is substantially different 
than the standard for negligent homicide. Compare State v. Dyer, 
671 P.2d 142 (Utah 1983) (the difference between reckless and 
criminally negligent conduct is that under the former, one 
perceives a risk and consciously disregards it, whereas under the 
latter, one fails to perceive the risk). 
Appellant's argument confuses two distinct mens rea 
standards and, as such, should be disregarded. 
A, The Court of Appeals applied the proper 
standard for a Defendant's challenge of 
his conviction based on insufficiency of 
evidence. 
14 
Appellant enunciates a standard of review set forth in 
Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985).1 In Scharf, the 
court held: 
To mount a successful attack on the trial 
courtfs findings of fact, an appellant must 
martial all the evidence in support of the 
trial court's findings and then demonstrate 
that even viewing it in the light most 
favorable to the court below, the evidence is 
insufficient to support the findings. 
Id. at 1070. Appellant argues that the Scharf standard "should 
have been applied by the Court of Appeals" in the instant case 
(Appellant's Brief, page 22). Appellant's argument is wholly 
unsupported by Utah case-law and contradicts the standard of 
review for criminal appeals in Utah. The appropriate standard, 
which was followed by the Court of Appeals, was articulated in 
State v. Mills, 530 P.2d 1272 (Utah 1975). The Utah Supreme 
Court stated: 
For a defendant to prevail upon a challenge 
to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain 
his conviction, it must appear that, viewing 
the evidence and inferences that may 
reasonably be drawn therefrom in a light most 
favorable to the verdict of the jury, 
reasonable minds could not believe him guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Mills, 530 P.2d 1272. The Court of Appeals followed precisely 
^Appellant incorrectly cites Scharf v. BMG Corp., as "State 
v. BMG Corporation." 
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the standard which was articulated in Mills and subsequent Utah 
case law. Warden. 784 P.2d 1204, 1208-1209. 
Utah courts have expressed a willingness to overturn 
jury verdicts where evidence is insufficient to sustain the 
conviction. For example, in State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443 (Utah 
1983), the defendant was convicted at trial of second-degree 
murder. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the conviction was 
reversed upon grounds that the evidence presented by the 
prosecution failed to prove that the defendant "intentionally and 
knowingly11 caused the death of the victim. Id. at 444. See also 
State v. Bolsinger, 699 P.2d 1214 (Utah 1985) (evidence 
insufficient to convict defendant of second-degree murder); State 
v. Johnson, 663 JP.2d 48 (Utah 1983) (evidence insufficient to 
convict defendants of theft by deception); State v. Anderton, 668 
P.2d 1258 (Utah 1983). 
Similarly, in the instant case, the state failed to 
present evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction for 
negligent homicide. 
B, Appellant confuses the standard for 
"conflicting evidence11 with the standard for 
"insufficiency of evidence." 
In response to the Court of Appeal's opinion, 
appellant contends that the court failed to recognize the rule 
regarding "conflicting evidence" (Appellant's Brief, page 10). 
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Appellant correctly states the r u ^ • ipplied In Tolman, but 
- . - J J ntc nJ, 1 u/t i I'K.j fv idence11 
rule :r>i : . :.«. preclude J O ^ T from reversing a jury 
verdict where ~:\c evidence presentees r cue state fails to meet 
the burden therefore, "reasonable minds must have 
entertained reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the 
< :rime \ :: >f - w : t • n :i)i n r i c ited. " Tolman, 77 5 P 2d 42 2 , 12 4 , 
Indeed, the Court of Appeals did not assert that it reversed the 
trial court fs verdict on the qrounds th.it the defendant presented 
"con * nrr anH rontrad i c z ^ i', 3\ dence, but rather on the 
grounds tha: vr»- prosecution failed o present evidence of 
; — 1 in otht' r wot «Js , 
the state ^ evidence failed r sh . o i "substantial and 
unjustifiable risk of death existed of which the Defendant should 
have been aware." Warden, 784 P.2d at 1 2 09 . the Court of 
Appeals properly :ollowed Utah law regarding the review of 
fluff i <: i ent 7 i \ i ev . : "i- , See state v . Watson , h K i P, 2d 3 9 „ 4 L 
(Utah 1984); State v. Stewart, 729 P.2d 610 (Utah 1986). 
Appellant's recital "conflicting evidence" 
i; t.amdanl doo . i 10 t ap^ * ^ p p e a i B reversal of Dr. 
Warden's conviction on the grounds of "insufficiency of 
evidence," 
II. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL FAILED TO 
SHOW THAT DEFENDANT'S CONDUCT CONSTITUTED A 
"SUBSTANTIAL AND UNJUSTIFIABLE RISK" WHICH 
WAS A "GROSS DEVIATION" FROM THE STANDARD OF 
CARE THUS CAUSING THE DEATH OF THE CHILD. 
In Utah, in order to be convicted of negligent 
homicide, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant was guilty of criminal negligence. Utah Code Ann. §7 6-
5-206 (1990) . A person engages in conduct: 
With criminal negligence or is criminally 
negligent with respect to circumstances 
surrounding his conduct are the result of his 
conduct when he ought to be aware of a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the 
circumstances exist or the result will occur. 
The risk must be of such a nature and degree 
that the failure to perceive it constitutes a 
gross deviation from the standard of care 
that an ordinary person would exercise in all 
the circumstances as viewed from the actor's 
standpoint. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-2-103(4) (1990) (emphasis added). Upon 
reviewing the trial court's record, the Court of Appeals 
correctly concluded that the evidence presented failed to show 
that a "substantial and unjustifiable risk" of death to the child 
existed of which Defendant should have been aware. Warden, 784 
P.2d at 1209. The State's quantum of evidence was insufficient 
to meet its burden of proof and the reversal of Defendant's 
conviction was appropriate. 
A. The evidence presented at trial was 
insufficient to establish that 
Defendants conduct constituted a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk. 
18 
Standard of Care • 
Al ; . the prosecution el :i el ted expert testimony 
from Drs. Kramer and Chan that: it: was outside the standard of 
i": a r e f o r De f' e n d a n f 1' i1 I e i i v c,i. 11 i e i t h h :i s g r a n dm o t h e r a n d 
mother when the baby was premature and manifested symptoms of 
possible respirator istress. {' -; ^ ^,
 ±±ne 23-
page ...... T naqt . ;;.,t: page 257, line 
5 ) . ' ~ was conceded, however . that :here was * •-• chance that 
I,he . . -e:-.<-•- . :i, .it J"// , 
line 19 - page 26 1, line 6 ) . Furthermore, Dr. Chan stated that, 
while he was nf the opinion that Defendant's conduct was outside 
the standard Df care, other competent physicians may disagree 
with his assessment (T. Vol. Ill, page 273, 1 i ne 6 - page 275, 
l i n e \1J) in 'linrl' , -iippel 1 diit i;dih<ii ! o sh o w tint" P"f:> t Hnddiii " s' 
conduct was necessarily outside the civil standard or care - let 
alone the criminal standard. Appellant's expert testimony did 
110I 11nl1cdl.il' UI'M« ridlhui'e o r j e g r e e o f r i s k c a u s e d b y 
Defendant's conduct as required State v. Warden, 784 P.2d 
1204 ] 207 (1 Jtah Ct App ] 989) Appel lai it'"' s e vi dence 
therefore did not meet the "substantial and unjustifiable risk11 
burden of proving criminal negligence. 
2. Defendant's Conduct was not the cause of the 
Child's Death, 
For a person to be convicted of negligent homicide, the 
state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the alleged 
"gross deviation" from the standard of care "caused the death" of 
the victim. Utah Code Ann. §76-5-206(1) and §76-2-103(4) (1988). 
In the instant case, there is insufficient evidence to establish 
the necessary causal link between Defendant's conduct and the 
death of Jareth Young. 
The State alleged that Defendant's conduct was outside 
the medical standard of care, thus giving rise to certain 
"substantial and unjustifiable risks" which caused the death of 
the child. Those risks are stated as follows: 
(A) Vaginal Bleeding. 
The State elicited expert testimony from Drs. Bitner 
and Branch that vaginal bleeding on the day of delivery gave rise 
to a potentially serious problem (placenta previa, abrupto, etc.) 
necessitating hospital evaluation. Since Defendant responded 
with conservative care (watch and wait) as opposed to requiring 
Joanne to be admitted to the hospital, the State contends he was 
outside the applicable standard of care (T. Vol. II, page 172-
page 259; Vol. Ill, page 155 - page 233). 
However, the testimony of the doctors makes it clear 
that the bleeding did not result in a placental accident (T. Vol. 
II, page 240, line 19 - page 241, line 8; Vol. Ill, page 203, 
20 
line 11 -- page 2 0 5, 1 J ine 2), did not injure the child nor result 
i ii its death , dOiisequtjTit 1 y , t.tici.'w 11» no uiiusd I 1 \ nk, between Ihe 
bleeding and the deviation from the alleged medical standard. 
(B) Leaving the child with ,.Ivy_ and Joanna Iulluwmq 
Its birth without insisting upon hospitalization: 
Both Drs. Kramer and Chan testified that the child's 
1! ife mi ght ha v e beei I spared had 1 t r ecei v ed medical attentioi I up 
to 1! hours after birth, (T. Vol, ]], |»age 290 , Line 18 - page 
Z92f i j L n e 1 4^ T^ V o i < i J | ^ p((ll|e 2 6 4 ( | i n e f _ ( ) a q e ?(i6( !iri)1 „ ^ 
Since the chi Id was born at 1 0:40 p.m. , his 1 Ife may have been 
spared had he received medical attention as late as 9:40' a.m. to 
Defendant assessed Ivy Young as being capable of 
observing the child immediate! y fol lowi ng the hi rth She was the 
mother of seven, four of whom were born at home (T. Vol. IV, page 
52# 1 ine 8 page 55, 1 i ne 1) Fol lowi ng delivery, he advised 
the child must be observed during the night regarding its 
temperature, color and respirations and, further, to phone if the 
chi J,r| worsened ( Id. naa^ Qfi. line 13'- page A)i: .ine .-) . 
Ivy acknowledged that Dr. Warden asked her to observe the child 
D I! 1 I, p a g e 4 I.I I i n e s ] 9- 22) although she 
denied that Defendant instructed her on which symptoms to watch 
(T. Vol. I, page 85, lines 22-23). 
Nevertheless, she knew the body temperature of a new 
born infant was important to its health (T. Vol. II, page 44, 
line 14-20) and that it was a very serious emergency if the .child 
had difficulty breathing (Id. at page 64, line 18 - page 68, line 
11). During the night, she observed the extremities of the child 
becoming more blue (Id. at page 54, lines 14-19). She observed 
the child's labored breathing and, at approximately 8:00 a.m., 
thought the child had stopped breathing (Id. at page 64, line 18 
- page 68, line 11). She knew that she was to call the doctor 
if the child's condition worsened (£d. at page 51, line 6-20). 
Notwithstanding, she failed to timely call the Defendant and when 
she did so, and he was not in, she failed to identify herself or 
leave word of an emergency (Id. at page 69, lines 2-13; page 71, 
line 7, page 72, line 4 and T. Vol. V, page 23, line 17 - page 
24, line 21). Finally, she failed to seek alternate emergency 
medical aid from any other source. 
Since the child may have lived had medical attention 
been obtained within 11-12 hours after birth, and since the delay 
in obtaining the medical care was the fault of the grandmother 
rather than Defendant, the evidence proffered by the state was 
insufficient to convict the Defendant of: negligent homicide. 
22 
The childfs death was not caused b^ Defendant leaving 'cue child 
v i tin uie iami I y , leather , i +" resn . id because thp ch : . i * s 
grandmother failed to reasonably aot when she perceived the 
chilli's deter iorat i n id it: ion . . 
There is evidence that Defendant should have 
foreseen that Ivy Young woul -< ta x. I G contact him or seek 
a ] ter it l a tie emergency medical c JLL v a i r_ -?r havi r\a perceived that the 
child's condition was worsening. /tiu- - :>> Court of Appeals 
I 'or rf'ctl ;y u\v,\ I l.ha t • *• - -as ; r i ciently 
inconclusive111 to establish that there was a substantial and 
unjustifiable.risk of death such that defendant should have been 
i w a i i - i J t i I |! Warden, 7 8 4 P. 2 c:i at 12 39 . 
• • The evidence presented by Defendant 
demonstrated that his conduct was 
within the standard of care. 
When estab 1. i sh Iruj t hn appropi: i ate standard o I ca re at 
trial, Defendant elicited expert testimony from Dr. Gregory 
White. Dr. white, a respected home delivery practitioner who had 
del ivered approximate v .ac.es a+* home, over the past 40 
years, concluded that Warden had acted appropriately. In his 
I est I ninny, Mr Wh I ed l""h '• • {i * 1 /:=i ; rcumstances 
surrounding Joanne Young *s pregnancy -jome delivery would have 
been appropriate (T. v^x. xv, page .46;. lie concluded that an 
i lltrasound was not reqin rp.d under the circumstances (Jd. at ,^0) 
and that hospitalization was not required upon the mother's 
"spotting" (Id. at 254). 
Dr. White added that a physical examination was not 
needed after the mother's cramping and spotting ceased or when 
she experienced 15 minute contractions (Id. at 257-59); that Dr. 
Warden's examination of the newborn was adequate and appropriate 
(Id. at 266-69); that the examination and prematurity of the baby 
did not indicate immediate hospitalization (Id. at 271) ; that the 
infant's grunting did not demand immediate hospitalization, 
especially when relieved by a change of position (Id. at 274-75) ; 
and that it would be appropriate to leave the child in the care 
of its grandmother and mother with instructions to call him upon 
observing a change of condition (Id. at 277). In short, Dr. 
Warden's conduct did not deviate from the standard of care 
applicable in a home delivery setting. 
Thus, in assessing the testimony offered by both the 
appellant and the Defendant, it is clear that appellant's 
evidence did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
Defendant's conduct created a "substantial and unjustifiable 
risk" of death to the child. First, appellant's evidence failed 
to demonstrate that Defendant's conduct was clearly outside the 
standard of care for home delivery (T. Vol. Ill, page 273, line 6 
- page 275, line 15). In contrast, Defendant's expert testimony 
24 
indicated that his conduct was within the standard of care i T 
VI.JI IV, piiqc , In- ''| • S e c o n d , t h e bl:ai e t a i l e d t"o m e e t t h e 
burden of proving that Defendant's conduct constituted a "gross 
de v i a t i o n f r on t h e s t a i i cl a r d • :> f c a r e ,' A s s \ 1 c h t f i e C o u i t o f 
Appeal fs reversal of Defendant's conviction was correct and 
should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the Utah Court of Appeals correctly 
reversed the convi cti on of Dr Warden which .s'hou1d be i ffir med 
for the follou.. ^  reasons: 
First 
s tandar :l c f 
presented at -: : t. 
Second, une 
evidence at *" ^  * =•1 *~^ 
"substantial and unjustifiabl 
f h,at' line sho'i.t I 
that his conduct constituted i 
Appeals correctly applied the 
.: : i c I e n c y o f e v I d e i i c e 
?
 * . «^* e s e n t si if f i c i e n t 
conduc t c o n s t i t u t e d a 
isk1* t d e a t h t o t h e c h i l d s u c h 
-) u f ri ,. 1 e d t :) e s t a. b 1 i s h 
^rosr deviation from the standard 
of care." 
Th ird, i' :efense,:s testimony established that 
defendant's conduct was within the standard of care for home 
deliveries. 
2 5 
Fourth, appellant's contention that the Court of 
Appeals should have applied the standard for "conflicting and 
contradictory evidence" is misplaced. The Court did not reverse 
defendant's conviction on the grounds that defendant presented 
contradictory evidence, but rather on grounds that the state 
failed to present sufficient evidence establishing Defendant's 
guilt of criminal negligence beyond a reasonable doubt. 
is /I DATED th  day of September, 1990. 
MORGAN & /HANSEN 
Hansen^ 
Attorney for Appellee 
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Defendant finally claims that his right Lo 
compulsory process and discovery was de-
nied by the quashing of his subpoenas duc-
es tecum at the preliminary hearing. In 
quashing defendant's subpoenas, the mag-
istrate instructed defendant to follow the 
provisions of rule 16 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure in his discovery efforts. 
Defendant apparently followed this instruc-
tion with the State's cooperation. The 
record is devoid of any expression of dis-
satisfaction or objection to this method of 
discovery, and there is no evidence that 
defendant was prejudiced. 
Having reviewed defendant's other 
claims of error, we find them to be without 
merit 
Affirmed. 
HOWE, Associate CJ., and 
STEWART and DURHAM, U, concur. 
ZIMMERMAN 1, concurs in the 
result 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
David R. WARDEN, Jr., M.D., 
Defendant and Appellant 
No. 880575-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Nov. 22, 1989 
rtoheai ing Denied Jan. "19, 1000 
Physician was convicted of negligent 
homicide in regard to his home delivery of 
infant by the Second Circuit Court, Layton 
Department, K. Roger Bean, J., and physi-
cian appealed. The Court of Appeals, 
Bench, J., held that (1) expert testimony 
was required; (2) experts were properly 
liwlified, and (3) evidence was insufficient 
to support conviction. 
Reversed. 
Greenwood, J., filed opinion u»m umng 
in part and dissenting in part. 
1. Homicide <s»74 
Negligent homicide involves defen-
dant's perception of risk and necessarily 
requires evaluation of his or her state of 
mind. 
2. Homicide <3=>282 
Whether defendant negligently fails to 
perceive risk and thus is guilty of negligent 
homicide is question of fact for jury 
3. Homicide <3=>230 
Expert testimony is not required to 
prove mental state of criminal defendant 
accused of homicide. 
4. Homicide <s»250 
Expert testimony was required in trial 
of physician for negligent homicide of in-
fant he delivered at mother's home; with-
out understanding of nature and degree of 
risk, jury could not determine whether risk 
was substantial and if so, whether physi-
cian's failure to perceive it was grossly 
negligent and risk was not oije within com-
mon knowledge and experience of layper-
sons. 
5. Criminal Law <3»479 
State's medical witnesses were proper-
ly qualified as experts to testify against 
physician charged with negligent homicide 
in home delivery of infant, despite fact that 
experts did not attend home deliveries; no 
board certification or recognized medical 
specialty in home delivery existed and 
medical principles applicable to delivery of 
infants were applicable regardless of 
whether birth occurs at home or in hospi-
tal 
6. Homicide <£=>250 
Evidence was insufficient to sustain 
conviction of physician on charge of negli-
gent homicide in home delivery of infant, in 
regard to physician's failure to hospitalize 
infant who was born with respiratory dis-
tress; expert medical witnesses testified 
STATE v. 
Cite a« 784 PJtd 12 
that when physician left patient's home, 
baby's vital signs were acceptable, and that 
it was very unusual for child to die at this 
gestation and birth weight from hyaline 
membrane disease. 
Darwin C. Hansen, Bountiful, for defen-
dant and appellant 
Melvin C. Wilson and Brian J. Namba, 
Parmington, for plaintiff and respondent 
OPINION 
Before BENCH, GREENWOOD and 
BULLOCK,1 JJ. 
BENCH, Judge: 
Defendant appeals his jury conviction of 
negligent homicide, a class A misdemeanor, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-206 
(1978). We reverse the conviction. 
PACTS 
Defendant David R. Warden, Jr., is a 
licensed and board-certified physician who 
began practicing family medicine in Kays-
ville, Utah, in 1968. As part of his prac-
tice, defendant provides obstetrical care, 
and estimates that he has attended approxi-
mately 2500 births, 300 of which have been 
home deliveries. 
In September 1986, defendant was visit-
ed in his office by Joanne Young, who 
consulted defendant because she was preg-
nant out-of-wedlock and wanted to have 
her baby at home. Joanne testified that 
she was embarrassed about her pregnancy 
and "didn't want to have to go to the 
hospital and have people know." She also 
expressed a desire to keep the expenses of 
birth to a minimum. Defendant evaluated 
her for home delivery, considering the risks 
of her pregnancy, the proximity of hospital 
facilities, and the availability of family sup-
port to care for the infant and mother after 
birth. Defendant determined that Joanne's 
pregnancy was low risk and that medical 
facilities were nearby. He also learned 
that Joanne's mother, Ivy, was to be the 
WARDEN Utah 1205 
•4 (UtahApp. 1989) 
primary caretaker after birth and that Ivy 
had given birth at home to four of her 
seven children. Based on this evaluation, 
defendant decided that Joanne was a suit-
able candidate for home delivery and 
agreed to attend the birth. He also made 
arrangements to obtain Joanne's medical 
records from her previous doctor, and on 
the basis of that information and his own 
examination, calculated her delivery date to 
be in early December. 
On the morning of November 7, Joanne 
began experiencing vaginal bleeding. Ivy 
called defendant, who was in Salt Lake 
City at the time. Defendant expressed con-
cern that labor was beginning and advised 
Ivy to confine Joanne to bed and to contact 
him immediately if the bleeding became 
heavier or if strong contractions began. 
That afternoon, Ivy called defendant again 
and told him that the bleeding had stopped. 
She also told him. that she had spoken with 
the father of the child and that he had told 
her that conception had occurred a month 
earlier than originally believed. Defendant 
testified that this information led him to 
think that the labor was not premature, 
and he advised her to call again as labor 
continued. Ivy dlid so that evening, report-
ing that Joanne was having occasional con-
tractions. Defendant told her to call back 
when the contractions were three to five 
minutes apart. At about 10:15 p.m., Ivy 
informed defendant that the final stage of 
labor had begun. Defendant arrived at the 
house fifteen minutes later. 
Shortly thereafter, Joanne gave breech 
birth to a male infant which appeared to be 
healthy, but weighed only an estimated 
four to five pounds. The baby exhibited 
some respiratory distress which defendant 
attributed to prematurity. Defendant tes-
tified that he suggested hospitalization of 
the infant to Ivy, but that Ivy was con-
cerned because there was no health insur-
ance to cover those expenses. (Ivy denied 
that she ever discussed with defendant hos-
pitalization of the infant.) Defendant in-
structed Ivy how to position the infant to 
1. J. Robert Bullock, Senior District Judge, sit-
ting by special appointment pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-3-24(10) (Supp.1989). 
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relieve some of the respiratory distress and 
showed Joanne how to nurse the baby He 
also instructed Ivy to keep the child warm 
and to monitor the baby's temperature, col-
or, and breathing. After instructing Ivy to 
call him if there were any changes in the 
baby's condition, defendant left at about 
11:30 p.m. 
During the night, Ivy moved Joanne and 
the baby into a warmer room. Ivy noticed 
that the child's hands and feet were "very 
blue," but did not call defendant At 8:00 
a.m., the baby appeared to have stopped 
breathing. Ivy attempted to resuscitate 
him for about twenty minutes, and appar-
ently the infant responded. She then 
called defendant's office, but was told he 
was at home. When Ivy called defendant's 
home, his wife advised her he was not 
there, but would be in his office by 9:30 
a.m. In neither call did she identify her-
self, leave a message, nor report that there 
was any emergency. She apparently was 
aware defendant was not inaccessible in 
such a situation, but did not make further 
attempts to reach him. She did not take 
the infant to the hospital or notify emer-
gency services. She testified that in Eng-
land, her native home, "you would have 
had to have a doctor's permission to have 
called an ambulance." 
At about 8:30 a.m, Ivy called a fnend 
but did not tell her that the child was 
having difficulty breathing. She also 
called her clergyman, but did not advise 
him until 9:30 or 10:00 a.m. that the baby 
was having respiratory difficulty. The 
clergyman called a local pediatrician, who 
arrived at the Youngs' home at about 10:30 
a.m. only to find the infant "lifeless." The 
baby was taken to i hospital, but was 
pronounced dead shortly after arrival. 
A postmortem examination revealed that 
the infant was born approximately six to 
seven weeks premature and had died from 
respiratory distress caused by prematurity 
of the lungs (hyaline membrane disease). 
Defendant subsequently was charged with 
one count of negligent homicide. 
An initial jury trial ended in a mistrial 
prior to the rendition of a verdict A sec-
ond jury trial was held February 22-?6 
1988, and defendant was convicted as 
charged. Defendant's motions to arrest 
judgment and for a new trial were denied. 
ISSUES 
Defendant raises essentially two issues 
on appeal, arguing for a reversal of his 
conviction. He first claims that the State's 
expert witnesses were not qualified to tes-
tify as to the applicable medical standard 
of care. Second, he argues that there was 
insufficient evidence to establish that his 
conduct deviated significantly from the ap-
plicable standard of care and that there 
was a causal connection between his con-
duct and the baby's death. 
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
ri, 2] Conduct constituting the crime of 
negligent homicide occurs when an "actor, 
acting with criminal negligence, causes the 
death of another." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-206(1) (1978). The culpable mental 
state for criminal negligence requires "only 
that a defendant 'ought to be aware of a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk' of 
death." State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 254, 
267 (Utah 1988) (quoting Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-2-103(4) (1978)); see also 2 C. Torcia, 
Wharton's Criminal Law § 168 (14th ed. 
1979). Furthermore, "[t]he risk must be of 
such a nature and degree that the failure 
to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation 
from the standard of care that an ordinary 
person would exercise in all the circum-
stances as viewed from the actor's stand-
point" Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(4) 
(1978). Consequently, negligent homicide 
involves a defendant's perception of risk 
ind necessarily requires an evaluation of 
his or her state of mind. State v. Wessen-
dorf, 777 P.2d 523, 525-26 (Utah CtApp. 
1989). Whether a defendant negligently 
fails to perceive the risk is a question of 
fact for the jury. See State v. Howard, 
597 P.2d 878, 881 (Utah 1979). However, 
the risk of death "must be of such a degree 
that an ordinary person would not . . . fail 
to recognize it" State v. Dyer, 671 P.2d 
142, 148 (Utah 1983), 
STATE v. WARDEN 
Cite as 784 POd 1204 (UtahApp. 1989) 
Utah 1207 
Because the "failure to perceive the risk 
constitutes a gross deviation from the rea-
sonable man standard," ordinary negli-
gence adequate in the civil law is insuffi-
cient to constitute criminal negligence. 
State v. Chavez, 605 P.2d 1226, 1227 (Utah 
1979); see also Standiford, 769 P.2d at 
267; 2 C. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law 
§ 168 (terms such as "criminal negligence" 
are intended to connote deviations from 
reasonableness significantly greater in de-
gree than ordinary negligence). Thus, 
"[m]ere inattention or mistake in judgment 
resulting even in death of another is not 
criminal unless the quality of the act makes 
it so." People v. Rodriguez, 186 Cal. 
App.2d 433, 8 CaLRptr. 863, 868 (1960). 
EXPERT TESTIMONY 
[3] Defendant contends that expert tes-
timony was required in this case to estab-
lish the "standard of care," but that the 
State's medical experts were not qualified 
to testify. On the other hand, the State 
argues that expert medical testimony was 
not required, and that it needed only to 
present "competent evidence to show the 
nature and degree of risk and the circum-
stances as viewed from the actor's stand-
point" The State correctly observes that 
the "standard of care" in section 76-2-
103(4) refers to the actor's mental state, as 
opposed to medical malpractice cases in 
which expert medical testimony is required 
to show the applicable standard of medical 
care. See, e.g., Chadwick v. Nielsen, 763 
P.2d 817, 821 (Utah Ct.App.1988). I t is 
also true that expert testimony is not re-
quired to prove the mental state of a crimi-
nal defendant accused of homicide. See 
State v. Nicholson, 585 P.2d 60, 63 (Utah 
1978). 
[4] We conclude, however, that expert 
testimony was required in this case since 
such testimony was necessary to establish 
the nature and degree of risk. Section 
76-5-206(1) requires the State to prove be-
yond a reasonable doubt that defendant's 
judgment was criminally deficient because 
2. This is distinct from expert testimony as to the 
subjective intent of the defendant, i.e., "the ac-
tor's viewpoint," which need not be accepted by 
he failed to perceive a substantial risk that 
death could occur. Without an under-
standing of the nature and degree of risk, 
the jury could not determine whether the 
risk was substantial, and if so, whether 
defendant's failure to perceive it was 
grossly negligent Unless the risk is one 
within the common knowledge and experi-
ence of laypersons, it is unlikely that a jury 
could make an informed determination of 
culpability.2 We believe that expert testi-
mony is required where criminal negligence 
is alleged and the nature and degree of risk 
are beyond the ken of the average layper-
son. See, e.g., Ketchum v. Ward, 422 
F.Supp. 934 (W.D.N.Y.1976) (State's use of 
expert medical testimony at trial supplied 
sufficient evidence of criminal negligence 
for negligent homicide conviction in death 
of mother on whom physician had per-
formed legal abortion). 
[5] Defendant argues that the State's 
expert medical witnesses did not qualify as 
experts because they do not attend home 
deliveries. The witnesses included two ob-
stetrician/gynecologists, a pediatrician, and 
a neonatologist Citing the medical mal-
practice case of Burton v. Youngblood, 
711 P.2d 245, 248 (Utah 1985) (a practition-
er of one school of medicine is not compe-
tent to testify as an expert against the 
practitioner of another school), defendant 
argues that the State's doctors were not 
qualified to testify because they were of a 
different school of medicine than defen-
dant 
The qualification of an expert witness is 
a matter within the sound discretion of the 
trial court. State v. Espinoza, 723 P.2d 
420, 421 (Utah 1986). There was evidence 
in the record liiat there is no board certifi-
cation or recognized medical specialty in 
home delivery. There was also evidence 
that the medical principles applicable to the 
delivery of babies are applicable whether a 
birth occurs at home or in a hospital. In 
view of the record evidence, the trial court 
was within its discretion to qualify the 
State's medical witnesses as experts. Cf. 
the court and which is ultimately a determina-
tion for the jury. 
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Burton, 711 P.2d at 249 (if methods and 
procedures of general plastic surgeon were 
shown to be identical to those of specialized 
plastic surgeon, one may testify against 
the other); Wessel v. Erickson Landscap-
ing Co., 711 P.2d 250, 253 (Utah 1985) 
(nothing precludes testimony from expert 
in another trade if the standard is the same 
for both). "The critical factor in determin-
ing the competency of an expert is whether 
that expert has knowledge that can assist 
the trier of fact in resolving the issues 
before it" Id. at 253; see also Utah 
R.Evid. 702. We conclude that the trial 
court committed no abuse of discretion in 
allowing the State's experts to testify. 
SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE 
[6] Defendant claims that the evidence 
presented was insufficient to establish 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt To con-
vict a person of violating section 76-5-
206(1), the State must establish, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, both prohibited conduct 
and a culpable mental state. To establish a 
culpable mental state, the prosecution must 
present evidence that defendant was un-
aware of a substantial and unjustifiable 
risk of death, but should have been so 
aware. 
We review defendant's claim under a 
standard that does not permit us to substi-
tute our judgment for that of the jury in a 
criminal trial. See State v. Tolman, 775 
P.2d 422, 424 (Utah CtApp.1989). Rather, 
we review the evidence and all inferences 
which may reasonably be drawn from it 
in the light most favorable to the verdict 
of the jury. We reverse a jury convic-
tion for insufficient evidence only when 
the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable 
that reasonable minds must have enter-
tained a reasonable doubt that the defen-
dant committed the crime of which he 
was convicted. 
State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 
1985) (quoting State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 
443, 444 (Utah 1983)); see also State v. 
Hopkins, 782 P.2d 475, 477. (Utah 1989). 
Defendant testified at trial that the 
grandparents weighed the newborn baby 
and determined it to be about five pounds. 
Defendant also said he believed the baby to 
be two to three weeks premature. Defen-
dant was aware that the baby was having 
"grunting respirations," which he said was 
a sign of early respiratory distress syn-
drome. Defendant positioned the baby in 
such a way that the labored breathing was 
relieved. He further testified that the se-
verity of the respiratory distress did not 
indicate a need for hospitalization. He said 
that he informed Ivy that the baby was 
premature and had difficulty in breathing, 
but that the baby was then stable. He 
instructed Ivy to call him if there was any 
change and admitted that he was depend-
ing on Ivy to carefully watch the infant 
Before leaving the Young residence, defen-
dant noted that the respiratory difficulty 
had subsided. He stated, "The baby was 
respiring well, the baby was still awake 
and alert and muscle tone was still good." 
He also said, 
I was impressed that the baby had al-
ready shown some signs of respiratory 
distress syndrome, but under similar cir-
cumstances in the past, I have left babies 
at home, having instructed the mother on 
how to nurse, having instructed the 
mother to keep the baby warm and there-
fore I felt I could leave, confident that 
grandma would call me, confident that if 
there were any progression of symptoms 
that I would be called. 
Defendant later testified that of 300 
home births he had attended, approximate-
ly ten of those babies had been premature. 
Eight of those had had respiratory distress, 
but defendant said that he had hospitalized 
only three of those eight In the case of 
this infant, defendant testified that "in my 
experience and the judgment that I applied 
at the time based on experience with babies 
who are even smaller than this delivered at 
home, they can in many cases get along 
very, very well " 
The State's expert medical witnesses tes-
tified that although the mother and baby 
"would do better" in a hospital, defendant's 
evaluation of the infant's well-being would 
indicate that the baby's vital signs were 
"acceptable." They conceded that the in-
STATE v. WARDEN 
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fant may have survived had he been hospi-
talized up to ten hours after birth, but 
believed that leaving the baby at home was 
"bad judgment" on defendant's part3 
The State's neonatologist testified that 
hyaline membrane disease is a progressive 
disease. He also indicated that a baby in 
the condition of the deceased is typically 
"at high risk for medical and surgical prob-
lems." As far as mortality for an infant 
with the disease, however, he stated that 
the failure to provide therapy would only 
place the probability of death at five to 
fifteen percent He later stated upon 
cross-examination that statistically only 
two percent of babies die from untreated 
hyaline membrane disease. He further 
said, "I guess the message is if s very 
unusual and rare to lose a baby at this 
gestation and this birth weight from hya-
line membrane disease." 
Asked whether it would be outside the 
medical standard of care to have the family 
of a home-delivered newborn to monitor 
any changes in the baby's condition, the 
neonatologist believed it was, but conceded 
that other competent physicians would dis-
agree with him. Other experts for the 
State testified that the medical community 
in Utah does not teach or train physicians 
for home delivery and generally recom-
mends against it 
We are convinced that even looking at 
the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the verdict, that evidence was "sufficiently 
inconclusive" to establish that there was a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk of death 
such that defendant should have been 
aware of it Thus in examining the evi-
dence presented, reasonable minds must 
have entertained "a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant committed the crime of 
which he was convicted." See Booker, 709 
P.2d at 345. 
Since we conclude that the evidence 
failed to establish criminal negligence, we 
need not reach the issue whether defen-
3. Our research has revealed very few cases in 
which licensed physicians have been charged 
with negligent homicide. In many of those 
cases where such a charge has been brought, 
albeit under differing statutes, the courts have 
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the legal dantfs acts or omissions were 
cause of death. 
Defendant's conviction is reversed. 
BULLOCK, J., concurs. 
GREENWOOD, Judge: (concurring 
and dissenting). 
I concur in Judge Bench's opinion con-
cerning expert testimony, but dissent from 
the opinion's conclusion that there was not 
sufficient evidence to sustain the jury's 
conviction of negligent homicide. The ma-
jority opinion correctly states the necessary 
quantum of evidence for negligent homi-
cide as being where the defendant should 
have been aware of a substantial and un-
justified risk of death, but was not State 
v. Wessendorf, 111 P.2d 523, 525 (Utah 
Ct.App.1989). Also, the risk must be such 
that an ordinary person would not dis-
regard or fail to recognize it State v. 
Dyer, 671 P.2d 142, 148 (Utah 1983). 
Therefore, in this case, the State was re-
quired to convince the jury that there was 
a substantial and unjustified risk that the 
infant would die if he did not receive medi-
cal care in a hospital-type setting; that 
defendant was unaware that the risk exist-
ed; and that an ordinary person in defen-
dant's position would have recognized that 
risk. Our task as; an appellate court, is to 
determine if the evidence presented, when 
viewed favorably to the jury verdict, "is 
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently im-
probable that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the crime of which he 
was convicted." State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 
342, 345 (Utah 1985) (quoting State v. Pe* 
tree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (1983)). 
My assessment of the evidence support-
ing the jury verdict is as follows: defen-
dant was a licensed physician who had 
maintained a family practice since 1968, 
including obstetrical care; defendant as-
sumed responsibility for the infant's physi-
cal well-being by agreeing to deliver it at 
held that no criminal liability attaches when 
death results from an error of judgment See 
generally Annotation, Homicide Predicated on 
Improper Treatment of Disease or Injury, 45 AX. 
R.3d 114 (1972). 
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home; defendant did not insist on exam-
ining the mother when she reported vaginal 
bleeding to determine if premature birth 
was likely or if so, what precautions should 
be taken to minimize the likelihood of pre-
mature birth; defendant diagnosed the in-
fant after birth as having Respiratory Dis-
tress Syndrome; defendant advised Ivy to 
position the infant in a way which relieved 
the symptoms but would not alleviate the 
condition itself; defendant minimized the 
seriousness of the infant's condition to Ivy 
and Joanne; three of the ten children he 
had delivered who had Respiratory Dis-
tress Syndrome were hospitalized; defen-
dant knew the infant could die from the 
disease and that the disease was progres-
sive; defendant could not himself admit the 
infant into a hospital because he lacked 
malpractice insurance, so would have to 
call another physician or have the infant 
admitted through an emergency room facil-
ity; Ivy testified that defendant only told 
her to watch the infant for changes in his 
temperature, color and respiration, without 
advising her as to the degree of change 
which might indicate a crisis, nor did he 
warn her or Joanne that death could result 
from the disease; and defendant left the 
infant in the care of laypersons. 
There was other, conflicting evidence 
which would indicate that defendant should 
not have been aware that a substantial risk 
existed. However, the existence of con-
flicting evidence, by itself, does not justify 
reversal of a jury verdict State v. Tol-
man, 775 P.2d 422, 424-25 (Utah CtApp. 
1989). The jury has been through the ar-
duous task of listening to and assessing the 
evidence presented in this most difficult 
case, and I do not think that we should 
appropriately substitute our judgment for 
that of the jury. The jury's conclusion was 
based on what defendant knew or the jury 
believed he knew at the time, and its as-
sessment that given that knowledge he 
should have known the risks. I do not find 
the evidence "sufficiently inconclusive/' as 
do my colleagues, to justify conviction. I 
would conclude that the record, while heat-
edly controverted, contains sufficient evi-
dence for the jury to conclude that defen-
dant should have been aware that a sub-
stantial and unjustified risk of death exist-
ed, and to convict defendant of negligent 
homicide as a result 
REGIONAL SALES AGENCY, INC, a 
Utah corporation, Plaintiff, Appellant, 
and Cross-Respondent, 
v. 
Roland W. REICHERT, Defendant, 
Respondent, and Cross-Appellant 
No- 88024&-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Nov. 24, 1989. 
Employer brought action against sales-
man for breach of noncompetition agree-
ment After denying salesman's motion to 
amend counterclaim, the Third District 
Court, Salt Lake County, Pat B. Brian, J., 
entered judgment on jury verdict awarding 
slightly less than $800 in damages and 
awarded contractual attorney fees in 
amount of $7,500 rather than almost $27,-
000 that had been sought Parties appeal-
ed. The Court of Appeals, Billings, J., held 
that (1) salesman bore burden of proving 
that there was no reasonable relationship 
between actual damages suffered by em-
ployer as result of his breach and amount 
employer would collect under agreement's 
liquidated damages provision; (2) liqui-
dated damages provision was not unreason-
able as a matter of law; (3) unexplained 
reduction of attorney fees sought could not 
stand on appeal; and (4) motion to amend 
counterclaim was properly denied. 
Affirmed in part, reversed and re-
manded in part 
1. Damages «=>163(3) 
In context of noncompetition agree-
ment's liquidated damages provision, sales-
